Partnerships by Waters, Steven A. & Fowler, Felicity A.
SMU Law Review
Volume 46





Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review by
an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation





HIS year's Survey period saw a number of cases with interesting part-
nership issues, some of which were secondary to the deciding issue
and appeared against a complex backdrop of other legal issues. Un-
like the past several partnership law surveys, this year the authors elected to
review several bankruptcy opinions that decided partnership issues.
For the reader's convenience, the cases are grouped under topical head-
ings corresponding to the most important partnership law aspect of the case.
I. PARTNER/PARTNERSHIP RELATIONSHIP
A. AUTHORITY OF A PARTNER TO BIND PARTNERSHIP
1. Authority of "Bankrupt" Partner to File Bankruptcy Petition
a. Phillips v. First City, Texas-Tyler, N.A., (In Re Phillips).'
This case is remarkable for several reasons. First, the court expressly re-
jected the analysis and conclusion of the 1986 California bankruptcy deci-
sion of In Re Safren.2 There the court held the term "bankrupt" under the
Uniform Act (promulgated in 1914) meant one who was the subject of a
liquidation proceeding, a concept that existed in 1914, but not one who was
in a reorganization proceeding, which did not appear until much later. 3 Sec-
ond, the court stated that Safren was the only reported case holding that
"bankrupt" under state partnership laws did not include debtors in a Chap-
ter 11 proceeding4. In fact, at least two Texas bankruptcy decisions have
agreed with Safren.5
The issue in Phillips was whether the sole general partner of a two-partner
limited partnership could file a voluntary Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganiza-
tion petition on behalf of the limited partnership, after the general partner
filed his own Chapter 11 petition. 6 The bankruptcy court and the federal
* B.A., Southern Methodist University; J.D., University of Texas. Attorney at Law,
Haynes and Boone, L.L.P., San Antonio Texas.
** B.S., Cornell University; J.D., Georgetown University Law Center. Attorney at Law,
Haynes and Boone, L.L.P., San Antonio, Texas.
1. 966 F.2d 926 (5th Cir. 1992).
2. 65 B.R 566 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1986).
3. Id. at 569.
4. Phillips, 966 F.2d at 931.
5. See In Re Hawkins, 113 B.R. 315 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1990); In Re BC&K Cattle Co.,
84 B.R. 69 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988).
6. See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101 - 11 (1988).
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district court agreed, for different reasons, that the general partner could file
a petition for the partnership. 7 The bankruptcy court held that Texas part-
nership law did not forbid the filing of the petition by the general partner;
but, that even if it did, federal bankruptcy law preempted state law and per-
mitted the filing.8 On appeal, the district court disagreed on the Texas law
issue but affirmed the lower court on the basis of federal preemption.9 The
Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded, rejecting both theories relied on by the
lower courts. It held that a general partner involved in his own bankruptcy
proceeding, even a Chapter 11 reorganization, did not have authority under
Texas law to file a petition for the partnership, and that federal law did not
produce a different result. 10
From the state law perspective, the court found that Section 35(3)(b) of
the Texas Uniform Partnership Act (TUPA), which provides that a partner-
ship is not "bound by any act of a partner after dissolution ... [w]here the
partner has become bankrupt," I I protects non-bankrupt partners from lia-
bility created by the acts of bankrupt partners. The court stated that the
outlook and responsibilities under federal bankruptcy law of a partner who
is the debtor in a federal bankruptcy proceeding may be quite different from
those that were present before the filing. 12 Accordingly, the court held that
the general partner in bankruptcy lacked authority under Texas law to file a
Chapter 11 petition for the limited partnership. 13 In so holding, the court
rejected each of the general partner's three arguments for a different inter-
pretation of Section 35(3)(b): (1) that he was not "bankrupt" within the
meaning of Section 35(3)(b) because he filed a voluntary petition under
Chapter 11 as opposed to Chapter 7,14 (2) that Section 35 only limits the
authority of bankrupt partners to bind partnerships to third parties, and does
not limit authority to wind up partnership affairs, and (3) the limited partner
had effectively consented to the general partner's action. 15
The court next examined federal law to determine if it preempted Texas
7. Phillips, 966 F.2d at 928.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 933, 935.
11. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 35(3)(b) (Vernon 1970).
12. The court gave special attention to Professor Bromberg's analysis of § 35(3)(b): "Pro-
fessor Bromberg, the chief draftsman of Texas' Uniform Partnership Act, suggests that the
reason for [section 35(3)(b)] may be the fear of binding the partnership to unwise transactions
entered into by the bankrupt partners." Phillips, 966 F.2d at 929. See ALAN R. BROMBERG &
LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN ON PARTNERSHIP § 7.16(d) (1991).
13. Phillips, 966 F.2d at 933.
14. In the Safren case, the court held that the term "bankrupt," as used in the California
version of the Uniform Partnership Act, did not mean a person who was the subject of a
reorganization proceeding under federal bankruptcy law. Safren, 65 B.R. at 569-70. The
court relied on two grounds: (1) that the concept of reorganization did not exist in 1914 when
the Uniform Partnership Act was promulgated, and (2) that the public policy inherent in a
reorganization proceeding - to allow time for a debtor to develop a plan under which its debts
would be restructured and it could continue its business in some form - would be undercut if
a reorganization proceeding filing automatically caused a dissolution of the partnership, which
(absent agreement of the partners) would in turn lead to a winding up (liquidation) and termi-
nation. Id.
15. Phillips, 966 F.2d at 929-33.
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law on the subject. Bankruptcy Rule 1004(a), relied on by the federal dis-
trict court to support its preemption holding, states: "A voluntary petition
may be filed on behalf of the partnership by one or more general partners if
all general partners consent to the petition."16
The court stated that before it could invoke Bankruptcy Rule 1004 to
preempt state law, it first must find a conflict between the two. It found
none.' 7 Essentially, the court held that the term "general partner," as used
in Bankruptcy Rule 1004, means a general partner who is fully-empowered
under applicable state law. The court concluded that the authority under
Texas law of a general partner in bankruptcy was restricted because (1)
Texas law makes a general partner "subject to all the restrictions and liabili-
ties of a partner in a partnership without limited partners;" and (2) Section
35(3)(b) of TUPA was such a restriction."8 Finding no conflict between
state and federal law, the court saw no basis on which to use Rule 1004 to
preempt the state law result.' 9
2. Authority of Partner to Bring Suit on Behalf of Partnership
a. Allied Chemical Co. v. DeHaven.20
The principal issue in Allied Chemical was the authority of a former part-
ner to bring a lawsuit on behalf of the partnership. 2' DeHaven, who had
withdrawn as a partner of the Maglon Partnership, sued for damages. De-
Haven alleged fraud and conspiracy on the part of an Allied officer and a
Maglon partner involving a breach of a contract between Allied and
Maglon.22
Allied complained that DeHaven lacked standing to sue on behalf of
Maglon. The court disagreed and noted that DeHaven was a partner of
Maglon at all relevant times: when the deal with Allied was struck, when the
deal with Allied was carried out, when payment made by Allied was re-
ceived and deposited, and when monies were paid by the partnership to Al-
lied's officer who cut the deal with Maglon's partner.23 The court noted the
common law rule that partners can bring suit on behalf of the partnership,
even though the partnership can sue in its own name under Rule 28 of the
16. Bankr. Rule 1004(a), 11 U.S.C.A. (1984).
17. Phillips, 966 F.2d at 933.
18. Id.
19. Id. The court also concluded that Rule 1004 could not, by itself, augment the state
law authority of a "general partner" because the bankruptcy rules expressly "shall not abridge,
enlarge, or modify any substantive right." Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2075).
20. 824 S.W.2d 257 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no writ).
21. Although the chronology of events in Allied Chemical is difficult to follow, it appears
that DeHaven sued Allied, the partnership and DeHaven's former partners. Subsequently, all
of the defendants except Allied ratified DeHaven's pleadings and were realigned as plaintiffs.
Id. at 264.
22. The contracts between Allied and Maglon were exchange agreements which the Al-
lied officer (Gambrell) and the Maglon partner (Novak) voided and replaced with a new ex-
change agreement calling for $330,000 more to be paid to Allied and $173,000 to be paid to a
company owned by Gambrell and Novak. Id. at 260.
23. Id. at 264.
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Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.24
Allied also argued that DeHaven's power to sue on behalf of the partner-
ship ended when he withdrew from Maglon. The court correctly differenti-
ated between termination and dissolution, noting that although DeHaven's
withdrawal dissolved the partnership, the result was not termination, but
winding up, the intermediate legal phase that follows dissolution.25 The
court also assessed the case's circumstances as "exceptional" and concluded
that it would be inequitable to prevent a resigning partner victimized by self-
dealing conspirators from suing on behalf of the partnership. 26
Allied lastly argued that, because a partnership is bound by the acts and
knowledge of a partner, a partner's execution of a contract on behalf of
Maglon bound the partnership and, thereby, DeHaven. The court rejected
that position, noting an important exception to the binding effect rule where
"a fraud on the partnership [is] committed by or with the consent of that
partner."'27 Here, the partner (Novak) conspired to misappropriate funds
from Maglon to benefit himself, Gambrell and Allied. Under those circum-
stances, Maglon was not bound by the partner's knowledge. 28
B. PARTNERSHIP OR PARTNER PROPERTY
1. In Re Cooper29
In this bankruptcy court decision, the debtor, Cooper, filed for relief
under Chapter 7 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.30 The filing included a
schedule of assets and liabilities and a statement of financial affairs that
claimed a business homestead exemption for office property and equipment,
tools and medical instruments. Cooper leased the "office homestead" at all
times to his own medical professional association, "Thomas W. Cooper,
M.D., P.A." Cooper's creditors filed objections to the claimed exemption,
arguing that the putative "office homestead" was in fact owned by a partner-
ship and could not be claimed by the debtor as exempt under Texas law.
Cooper and Schreiber jointly purchased the real estate at issue, placing
title in both of their names.3' The two borrowed money and built an office
building used by both to conduct business. United States partnership tax
24. Id. (citing Chien v. Chen, 759 S.W.2d 484, 491 (Tex. App.-Austin 1988, no writ)).
25. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, §§ 29-30 (Vernon 1970).
26. Allied Chemical, 824 S.W.2d at 264.
27. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 12 (Vernon 1970).
28. Allied Chemical, 824 S.W.2d at 265. Allied was, however, liable for the fraudulent
actions of its officer, Gambrell. Id. (citing Kirby v. Cruce, 688 S.W.2d 161, 165 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
29. 128 B.R. 632 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1991).
30. See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 701 - 766 (1979). A Chapter 7 proceeding is designed to
liquidate the debtor's non-exempt property, pay the debtor's creditors to the extent of the
proceeds of the liquidation, and discharge the debtor from the balance of those debts.
31. This fact created the issue that Cooper tried to exploit. Had title been taken directly
in the name of the partnership described later in the text, Cooper would likely not have fought
as hard for the exemption. The partnership statute, however, clearly contemplates that title to
partnership property may be taken in the name of one or more of the partners of the partner-
ship. See e.g., TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 10(3),(4) (Vernon 1970) (stating rules
governing the conveyance of partnership real property when title is held in partners' names).
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returns were filed for the "Schreiber-Cooper Building" partnership and in-
cluded individual Schedule K-is for Cooper and Schreiber that showed that
the two partners shared profits, losses, and capital equally.
In determining whether a partnership existed, the court discussed the "en-
tity theory" that generally pervades the TUPA, concluding that "the part-
nership, as a separate entity, owns the partnership property."' 32 Section
25(2)(c) of the TUPA specifically precludes a partner from validly claiming
a homestead interest in partnership property. 33
In its analysis, the court identified a number of factors that, if present,
were "indicators" that a partnership existed. Two of these factors, sharing
in the profits and losses of a business 34 and filing of partnership income tax
information returns, 35 were present in this case. The court found, however,
that the most important indicator is the intent of the parties: if they intend
to do a thing that by law constitutes a partnership, then they are partners
whether their expressed purpose was to create or avoid the relationship.
36
The court readily concluded that the partnership formed between Cooper
and Schreiber owned the business property and that Cooper could not, as a
matter of Texas law, claim the property as exempt.37 Therefore, Cooper's
only use of the property that he attempted to claim as exempt was as an
employee of the professional association. Cooper's exemption claim was
denied. 38
II. CREATION OF A PARTNERSHIP
A. PARTNERSHIP BY ESTOPPEL
1. Gosch v. B & 0 Shrimp, Inc. 39
In Gosch, B & 0 Shrimp sued Gosch, claiming that he was vicariously
liable for fraud committed by his partner, Bach. B & 0 Shrimp claimed that
a partnership existed by estoppel.4° Bach contracted with B & 0 Shrimp to
purchase a commercial shrimp boat. Bach then mortgaged the boat to se-
cure a $6,000 loan from Gosch, in breach of his conditional sales contract
32. Cooper, 128 B.R. at 636.
33. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 25(2)(c) (Vernon 1970). Section 25(2)(c) of
TUPA states:
A partner's right in specific partnership property is not subject to attachment or
execution, except on a claim against the partnership. When partnership prop-
erty is attached for partnership debt, the partners, or any of them, or the repre-
sentatives of a deceased partner, cannot claim any right under the homestead or
exemption laws.
Id. (emphasis added).
34. TUPA defines partnership as "an association of two or more persons to carry on as
co-owners a business for profit," TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 6(1) (Vernon
1970), and gives as a prima facie indicator "[tihe receipt by a person of a share of the profits of
a business." Id. § 7(4).
35. Cooper, 128 B.R. at 636.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 637.
39. 830 S.W.2d 652 (Tex. App.-Houston [list Dist.] 1992, writ denied).
40. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 16 (Vernon 1970).
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under which Bach was not to obtain title for at least one year. Bach de-
faulted on the loan, and Gosch foreclosed on and took possession of the
boat.
At trial, the President of B & 0 Shrimp testified that Bach introduced
Gosch as "my partner" and referred to him as "the man that's going to be
giving me the money that's going in partners with me on this shrimp
boat."'41 Corroborated trial testimony confirmed that Gosch heard those
statements and never denied the partnership. It was also found that Gosch
was present when the deal was initially negotiated and when B & 0 Shrimp
explained the conditional nature of the transaction to Bach.
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision that B & 0 Shrimp
relied on Gosch's failure to deny the representation of partnership and be-
lieved that Gosch and Bach were partners. The court found Gosch liable to
B & 0 Shrimp for the fraud committed by Bach. 42 Presumably, B & 0
Shrimp got its boat back, or the value of it.
B. INTENT Is THE KEY ELEMENT
1. City of Corpus Christi v. Bayfront Assocs., Ltd. 43
In Bayfront Associates, Bayfront leased a portion of Corpus Christi Bay
from the City, intending to fill the bay bottom (which required a Corps of
Engineers permit) and sublease it to various tenants, including a large com-
mercial aquarium. Local opposition to the proposed plan resulted in the
aquarium's being located elsewhere, causing the Corps of Engineers to with-
draw its notice of intent to issue the required permit. Bayfront sued the City
of Corpus Christi for breach of fiduciary duty. The main issue concerned
whether a joint venture or partnership relationship existed.
In considering the breach of fiduciary duty claim, the court examined the
lease to determine whether, in fact, a partnership existed. 44 The court listed
four essential elements to finding an implied partnership: (1) an agreement
to share profits, (2) an agreement to share losses, (3) a mutual right of con-
trol or management of the business, and (4) a community of interest in the
venture.45 The court also stated that the parties' intent to contract is a
prime element in determining whether a partnership exists.46
The court concluded that no partnership existed and computed the rent
payable to the City as a percentage of gross revenues. From this, the court
failed to find the profit-sharing agreement required for a partnership to ex-
ist.47 The parties also did not share losses, further supporting the absence of
41. Gosch, 830 S.W.2d at 655.
42. Id.
43. 814 S.W.2d 98 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, writ denied).
44. The parties did not expressly form a partnership; therefore, the court examined their
contractual leasehold relationship for evidence of a partnership.
45. Id. at 107 (citing Coastal Plains Dev. Corp. v. Micrea, 572 S.W.2d 285 (Tex. 1978)).
46. Id. at 108. See the discussion of the Cooper case, supra text accompanying note 36.
47. Id. The court noted 57 of the TUPA states that "[t]he receipt by a person of a share
of the profits of a business is prima facie evidence that he is a partner in the business, but no
inference shall be drawn if such profits were received in payment ... as ... rent to a landlord."
1636 [Vol. 46
PAR TNERSHIPS
a partnership. 48 In addition, the court noted that the control exercised by
the City was as a lessor, as the owner of the underlying fee and adjacent
streets and marina, and as an enforcer of municipal construction codes and
ordinances. The court concluded that this was not the mutual control re-
quired to find a partnership.4 9
The court disagreed with Bayfront's assertion that the parties' mutual in-
terest in the success of the development project satisfied the community of
interest criteria.50 It found that the parties' principal interests were quite
different - the City was concerned with a city-wide redevelopment scheme
and Bayfront was interested in profiting from subleasing the space.5' Fi-
nally, the court found that references by the mayor and other city represent-
atives to Bayfront as the City's "partner" were not determinative of the legal
relationship of a partnership.5 2 In sum, because no partnership existed, no
fiduciary duties existed and, therefore, no breach of a fiduciary duty
occurred.
2. FDIC v. Claycomb53
In Claycomb, the borrower asserted that a loan transaction was actually a
partnership relationship. The Fifth Circuit analyzed the borrower's claim
against the same four elements considered by the court in Bayfront Associ-
ates and concluded that a partnership or joint venture did not exist.5 4
Again, those essential elements are: (1) a community of interest in the ven-
ture/partnership; (2) an agreement to share profits; (3) an agreement to
share losses; and (4) a mutual right of control or management of the enter-
prise. Where one of the elements is absent, no joint venture or partnership
exists. 5
The court found no express agreement in the loan document obligating
the parties to share losses.56 The Fifth Circuit likewise rejected the bor-
rower's theory that a partial non-recourse provision in the loan documents
that contractually limited its liability to 50% of the loan evidenced an agree-
ment to share losses.5 7 Furthermore, there were several provisions in the
loan papers that specifically disclaimed the existence of any relationship
other than lender/borrower.5 8 The court found it unnecessary to consider
Id. (quoting TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 7(4)(b) (Vernon 1970)). So, even if the
lease had called for rent measured by a share of profits, the statute disclaims an inference of





52. Id. at 108-09.
53. 945 F.2d 853 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2301 (1992).




58. Section 4.15 of the Loan Agreement states in pertinent part: "4.15 No Liability of
Lender. Lender shall have no liability, obligation, or responsibility whatsoever with respect to
the construction of the Improvements except the Loan and the Borrower's Deposit pursuant to
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the other three elements once it concluded that one of the essential elements
of joint venture/partnership was missing.59 The absence of a partnership
defeated the borrower's defense based on the lender's alleged breach of fidu-
ciary duty. 6°
III. PARTNERS' FIDUCIARY DUTIES
A. LSP INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIP v. BENNETT (IN RE BENNETT) 6 1
In this case of first impression, the Fifth Circuit decided whether the man-
aging general partner of a limited partnership owed a sufficient fiduciary
duty directly to the limited partners to trigger application of 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(a)(4). Section 523(a)(4) denies a bankruptcy discharge of debts that
result from defalcation by a debtor who is acting in a fiduciary capacity. 62
In this case, a hotel development was undertaken with a two-tier owner-
ship structure in which a Texas limited partnership, MG was formed to own
and develop the hotel; its sole general partner was a limited partnership, No.
20, whose sole general partner was Bennett. The MG partnership agreement
gave No. 20 full, exclusive and complete authority and discretion to manage
the partnership. Similarly, Bennett, as the sole general partner of No. 20,
had full power or authority to direct its affairs.
The MG agreement called for a cash incentive payment to the general
partner (No. 20) of up to $4 million if the hotel project was completed for
less than the budgeted $22 million and was constructed and equipped as a
"first class hotel." The hotel was completed on time and apparently under
budget, for which Bennett rewarded No. 20 (himself) with a $1 million cash
distribution. It soon became clear that the "first class" requirement had not
been satisfied. Mildew appeared in hotel rooms, requiring remodeling to re-
verse a faulty design in the heating, ventilation and air conditioning system.
Some of the repairs were charged to the general contractor, but others were
improperly charged by the general partner to the partnership.63 The limited
partners' share of this cost was $72,000. 64
There were other improper charges and questionable actions. During con-
struction, the general partner entered into several hotel equipment leases and
this Loan Agreement .... " Id. at 859. The court looked to the Micrea case, cited in the
discussion of the Bayfront case, supra note 46, at 11, as controlling Texas law, and concluded
that the provision here that not only disavowed the existence of a partnership, but also dis-
avowed the sharing of losses, was even stronger than the facts in Micrea where the sharing of
losses element, although absent, was not expressly disclaimed.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 859-60. The case also upheld the application of an express usury savings clause.
Id. at 850-61. Such a clause expressly disclaiming an intent to charge or collect usurious
interest is routinely inserted into loan documents by knowledgeable lenders.
61. 970 F.2d 138 (Bankr. 5th Cir. 1992).
62. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) (1979): "A discharge under Section 727, 1141 or 1328(b) of
this title does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt ... for fraud or defalcation
while acting in a fiduciary capacity .... "
63. The bankruptcy court found the mildew problem to be a continuous construction
problem for which the general partner was responsible (including financially) under the MG
partnership agreement. Bennett, 970 F.2d at 140.
64. Id. at 141.
1638 [Vol. 46
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charged the rent to the limited partnership (as on going operating expense),
instead of buying the equipment outright and charging the cost to the con-
struction budget. The MG agreement required the general partner to equip
and furnish the hotel from that $22 million budget. 65 The amount wrong-
fully charged to MG for the equipment leases was found to be $832,204.40.66
The first question the Fifth Circuit considered was whether the fiduciary
duty owed by the managing general partner of a limited partnership to the
limited partners met the narrow requirements of Section 523(a)(4). 67 The
court reviewed Texas case law in some detail and found ample authority
imposing trust obligations on managing partners of a limited partnership,
sufficient to satisfy Section 523(a)(4). 68 The court also considered In Re
Hurbace,69 which held that Texas law did not impose the type of fiduciary
duty between equal co-partners of a general partnership (i.e. there was no
managing partner) required to satisfy the express trust requirements of
523(a)(4). 70 The Fifth Circuit distinguished this case from Hurbace because
of the different status of the co-equal partners in Hurbace and the managing
partner here - the managing partner had the control the Fifth Circuit said
was key to finding express trust fiduciary duty. Therefore, as to MG, No. 20
had the requisite duty.
The more difficult question was whether Texas law imposed or imputed
the same trust obligations on the managing partner of the managing partner.
Although one Texas case did hold that the general partner of a limited part-
nership owed fiduciary duties to the limited partners,71 the Fifth Circuit de-
clined to rely on that case because the Texas court's expansion of the
fiduciary duty was not made expressly. The court was unwilling to rely on
an implied expansion, stating that, in the Fifth Circuit, exceptions to dis-
65. It seems obvious that Bennett caused MG to lease equipment rather than acquire it to
make the construction budget look better. There were other "adjustments," including re-nego-
tiation of the base bid of one contractor to reduce the bid by $1,000,000 (the amount by which
the total of all bids exceeded the $22 million budget), and reduction of the fee paid to the same
contractor by one-half as compensation for MG's waiving the bonding requirement for that
contractor.
66. Id.
67. The court explained that to satisfy Section 523(a)(4), the trust must be an express trust
that the parties created or that resulted from a particular relationship, and not a constructive
trust imposed by law, after the fact, to prevent an unfair result in a particular transaction. Id.
at 143.
68. The court cited Huffington v. Upchurch, 532 S.W.2d 576 (Tex. 1976), as the primary
authority for imposing trustee-like duties on the managing partner of a partnership. Bennett,
970 F.2d at 145. The Hurbace court correctly pointed to TUPA § 21 as imposing a construc-
tive trust between partners, requiring each partner to hold for all of the partners' benefit any
profits derived in connection with the partnership business or from use of its assets. Id. The
Fifth Circuit found the element of control to be the key common thread among the cases,
including the Ninth Circuit case of Ragsdale v. Holler, 780 F.2d 794 (9th Cir. 1986) (the only
circuit court to have measured partners' duties to each other against the requirements of Sec-
tion 523(a)(4)), which imposed express trust liability between partners. The Hurbace court
expressly declined to follow Ragsdale on the basis that Texas courts had not imposed the same
type of fiduciary liability on partners as had California. In Re Hurbace, 61 B.R. at 566.
69. 61 B.R. 563 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1986).
70. Huffington, 532 S.W.2d at 144.
71. Crenshaw v. Swenson, 611 S.W.2d 886 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1980, writ refd
n.r.e.)
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charge are construed against creditors and in favor of the bankrupt. 72 Thus,
the court found that Texas law did not support imposition of an express
trust relationship between the managing partner of the managing partner of
a limited partnership and the limited partners. The result of all of this was
that, although Bennett was personally liable to the limited partnership for
the misappropriated funds, that liability was dischargeable in Bennett's
bankruptcy.
B. RODGERS V RAB INVESTMENTS, LTD. 7 3
RAB, a general partnership, and Rodgers and Boughton formed a general
partnership to renovate an apartment complex. Rodgers and Boughton
managed the project and each had a 25% interest. RAB had a 50% interest.
In an apparent attempt to insulate itself from the economic effect of cost
overruns and unexpected expenses, RAB formed and transferred its interest
in the project partnership to a limited partnership. 74 A few months later,
Rodgers and Boughton expelled RAB from the partnership and sued RAB
for breach of the partnership agreement. RAB counterclaimed alleging
fraud, breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty. The parties agreed
that, during the pendency of their dispute, no funds would be disbursed from
the project except by unanimous consent or by an order of the state district
court. Nevertheless, Rodgers and Boughton later paid themselves more
than $40,000 of project funds as commissions for the sale and lease of reno-
vated apartment units.
The jury found that RAB willfully breached the partnership agreement by
transferring its partnership interest to the limited partnership. Unfortu-
nately for them, however, Rodgers and Boughton had not sought damages
or other relief for that breach. 75 They were denied relief on appeal. 76 The
jury did find, however, that Rodgers and Boughton breached their fiduciary
duty to RAB by expelling RAB and by paying commissions to themselves,
for which the trial court awarded RAB compensatory and exemplary
damages. 77
In their appeal, Rodgers and Boughton first argued that RAB had no
standing to bring the lawsuit after transferring its partnership interest to the
limited partnership. The court found that the transfer was invalid and inef-
fective, based on restrictions stated in the partnership agreement. 78 This
conclusion seems completely inconsistent with the jury's finding that RAB
72. 970 F.2d at 148.
73. 816 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, no writ).
74. How that was to be accomplished is not obvious and was not explained in the opinion.
75. Id. at 546. RAB's action caused a dissolution of the partnership under TUPA Sec-
tions 29 and 31(2). Id. at 549. Several sections impose consequences for a "wrongful" dissolu-
tion or a dissolution "in contravention of the partnership agreement...," including TUPA
Section 38(2). TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. 2A. 6132b, § 38(2).
76. Rodgers, 816 S.W.2d at 546.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 547. The partnership agreement provided:
6.1 Transfer of Interest. Except as otherwise provided herein, no Partner may
sell, assign, transfer, encumber or otherwise dispose of any interest in the Part-
1640 [Vol. 46
PAR TNERSHIPS
willfully breached the partnership agreement by transferring its partnership
interest to a limited partnership. As noted, that was a wrongful dissolution.
The court's conclusion that the transfer was ineffective because it violated
the terms of the partnership agreement likewise appears wrong. The transfer
was wrongful, as the jury found, and the transferee could not become a sub-
stituted partner without the consent of the other partners (TUPA section
18(g)), but the appropriate relief is found in the provisions of the statute that
deal with wrongful dissolutions, not in allowing a party to benefit from its
own wrongful actions. Apparently, the court felt that RAB had been mis-
treated and it was determined to reach the result that it did. In any case, the
court found that the partnership (and the fiduciary relationship) continued
and that RAB had standing to bring the lawsuit.79
The court also held that, as a matter of law, Rodgers and Boughton dis-
solved the partnership when they expelled RAB and that, as a result, RAB
was entitled to be paid the value of its interest in the partnership as of the
date of expulsion/dissolution.80 In addition, the court determined that there
was enough evidence to support the jury award of exemplary damages to
RAB, in light of the flagrant self-dealing by Rodgers and Boughton in pay-
ing commissions to themselves in violation of the agreement requiring unani-
mous consent or court approval.81
IV. ENFORCEABILITY OF PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENTS
A. COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE
1. Peat Marwick Main & Co. v. Haass82
This case involved a partnership separation provision that the court ana-
lyzed as a covenant not to compete (over a vigorous dissent). The enforce-
ability of covenants not to compete has been a contentious area in Texas for
several years and, among other things, has inspired important legislative
changes. 83 Even though the subject provision pre-dated the 1989 statutory
changes, this court found that the result under them would have been the
same.
8 4
In Haass the partnership agreement of a national accounting firm, and a
related merger agreement, imposed liability for damages on a former partner
nership or assets of the Partnership without the unanimous prior written con-
sent of the other Partners....
6.7 Transfer of Partnership Interest.... In the event a Partner desires to sell,
assign, transfer or otherwise dispose of all or any part of the Partnership interest
owned or held by him ... [he shall,] as a condition precedent to his right to do
so, by notice in writing inform all other Partners... and ... offer such shares
for sale to the other Partners ....
Id.
79. Id. at 546.
80. Id. at 549.
81. Id. at 549-50.
82. 818 S.W.2d 381 (Tex. 1991)
83. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.50 (Vernon Supp. 1993) (Covenant Not to
Compete Act, 71st Leg., R.S., ch. 1193, § 2, 1989 Tex. Gen. Laws 4852).
84. Haass, 818 S.W.2d at 388.
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who solicited or furnished accounting services to partnership clients during
the first twenty-four months after the partner left the firm.8 5 The agree-
ments broadly defined client to include new clients originated during the
twenty-four months after the partner's separation, which could include cli-
ents with whom the former partner had no contact while at the prior firm.
The court, looking to covenant not to compete law for guidance, held that
the restriction was too broad and constituted an unreasonable restraint of
trade.86
The court also defined the three elements of a reasonable covenant not to
compete.87 First, the covenant must be ancillary to a valid contract, transac-
tion or relationship.88 Second, the restraint created must not be greater than
necessary to protect the promisee's legitimate interests, such as business
good will, trade secrets, or other confidential or proprietary information. 89
Third, the promisee's needs for the protection given by the agreement must
not be outweighed by either the hardship to the promisor or any injury likely
to the public.90 In this case, the court concluded that the covenant failed the
last two elements of the reasonableness definition. 9'
In his dissent, joined in by Justice Gonzalez, Justice Cornyn disagreed
that the provision at issue was a covenant not to compete, and found that the
provision was reasonably necessary to give the acquiring firm in the merger
the benefit of its bargain.92
B. DAMAGES OR A PENALTY
1. Phillips v. Phillips93
This case may be a useful reminder that the freedom to contract in the
partnership area, while very broad, is not without limit. The issue in Phil-
lips, which was actually more of a contract/penalty case than a partnership
case, concerned the distinction between liquidated damages and unenforce-
able penalties. The partnership agreement called for payment of decuple 94
the actual damages to the limited partner on a breach by the general partner.
The court held that provision to be an unenforceable penalty, not an enforce-
able liquidated damages provision.95 Although the case involved that sub-
85. Basically, the former partner had to pay to the firm fees received from those clients.
Id. at 385.
86. Id. at 388.





92. Id. at 388-91.
93. This is just one chapter in the saga of Mr. and Mrs. Phillips. Other matters involving
them, and the business aspects of the dissolution of their 32-year marriage, are contained in the
discussion of Phillips v. First City, Texas-Tyler, N. A. (In re Phillips), supra text accompanying
notes 1-19. 820 S.W.2d 785 (Tex. 1991). The lower court's opinion in this case was
summarized in an earlier survey article. See Steven A. Waters & Joni Gaylor, Partnerships,
Annual Survey of Texas Law, 45 Sw. L.J. 553, 567 (1991).
94. One does not often have the chance to use this word, meaning ten times.
95. Phillips, 820 S.W.2d at 789.
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stantive issue, it really was more important on a procedural point: whether
the penalty defense is waived if not plead under Rule 94 of the Texas Rules
of Civil Procedure, which provides that affirmative defenses not plead are
waived. The majority held that a contract containing a penalty should be
viewed the same as a plainly illegal contract that courts will refuse to en-
force, as a matter of public policy. 96 A spirited dissent argued that the fail-
ure to plead penalty as an affirmative defense was a waiver. Further, Mr.
Phillips volunteered the provision.97 It was part of a section of the partner-
ship agreement in which Mr. Phillips (as general partner) expressly agreed to
honor his fiduciary duty to Mrs. Phillips (as limited partner), as protection
to his soon-to-be-ex-wife that he would manage their $18 million of assets
impartially.98 The dissent continued that the majority's holding "bail[ed]
him out of his bargain." 99
V. PROCEDURAL ISSUES
A. RES JUDICATA
1. Barr v. Resolution Trust Corp. 100
This recent Texas Supreme Court case provides a detailed analysis of res
judicata in a partnership setting. The issue in Barr was whether a claim by a
financial institution against Barr, based on individual liability as a partner
for a partnership promissory note, is barred by application of the doctrine of
res judicata as a result of an earlier denial of a claim against him as a guaran-
tor of the same note.
In 1988, the lender filed two lawsuits, one alleging liability against the
partnership and against the remaining partner Knott, as guarantor, and the
other alleging that Barr was personally liable as a guarantor of the note.
Barr won a summary judgment in the second lawsuit on the ground that the
terms of the guaranty agreement were too uncertain to be enforced. The
lender amended its pleadings in the first suit to add Barr as a defendant,
based on his liability as a partner for the partnership promissory note.' 0 '
The trial court granted summary judgment for Barr on res judicata grounds;
the court of appeals, with one dissent, reversed the trial court's judgment,
holding that the doctrine did not apply to the facts of the case.
The Texas Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals
and affirmed the trial court's judgment holding any claim that, with dili-
gence, could have been brought in the first lawsuit was barred by res judicata





100. 837 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. 1992).
101. As a matter of partnership law, the lender was entirely correct: partners of a general
partnership have joint and several liability for partnership debts. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN.
art. 6132b, § 15 (Vernon 1970).
102. 837 S.W.2d at 631.
19931 1643
SMU LAW REVIEW
impose liability on Barr for payment of the notes and asked for the same
damages.103 Further, both suits required the same proof: that the partner-
ship notes existed, that the notes were due and that the partnership defaulted
in paying them. 104 The court disallowed the claim against Barr, stating that
"there is no valid reason to subject Barr to two different lawsuits."' 10 5 In so
doing, the court stated that it was reaffirming the "transactional" approach
to res judicata. 1'6 Essentially, this approach maintains that claims arising
from the same transaction that, with diligence, could have been brought in
the same lawsuit, cannot be divided and maintained separately.
B. LIABILITY OF INDIVIDUAL PARTNERS FOR PARTNERSHIP
OBLIGATIONS/SERVICE OF CITATION
1. Fincher v. B&D Air Conditioning10 7
The issue in Fincher was whether a partner in a Texas general partnership
who received service of citation on behalf of the partnership, could be found
individually liable although not named, individually, as a defendant in the
petition. The plaintiff subcontractor sued the owners of an apartment com-
plex, the original contractor, and another subcontractor to collect monies
owed to the plaintiff for materials furnished to refurbish the apartments.
The defendant subcontractor cross-claimed against the original contractor
and the apartment owners. One owner of the apartment complex was Yel-
low Ribbon Enterprises, a Texas general partnership composed of two part-
ners, W. Fincher, individually, and W. Fincher, Trustee for a Texas
corporation. The original petition named "Yellow Ribbon Enterprises and
William R. Fincher, Trustee," as defendants. The citation was addressed
"TO: Yellow Ribbon Enterprises, a limited partnership, by serving William
R. Fincher, its general partner." Actual physical service was made through
W. Fincher.
Under the TUPA, partner liability for partnership debts is joint and sev-
eral, not merely contractual. 108 Although the partners' individual liability is
derivative of partnership liability, it is in addition to partnership liability.
Suits may be brought against the partnership, with service on one partner. 109
The court pointed to the citation service rules of the Texas Civil Practice &
Remedies Code to support its finding that partners actually served with pro-






107. 816 S.W.2d 509 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 77 (Oct. 5, 1992).
108. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art 6132b, § 15 (Vernon 1970).
109. Id. § 15 cmt. (Vernon 1970).
110. Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 17.022, entitled "Service On Partnership,"
reads: "Citation served on one member of a partnership authorizes a judgment against the
partnership and the partner actually served." TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 17.022
(Vernon 1986) (emphasis added).
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The court reached an important distinction. Even though a partner is
jointly and severally liable for, and therefore can be sued on, liabilities estab-
lished by judgments against the partnership, the assets of the partner can be
reached only when there is a judgment against the partner, individually.III
Therefore, the court's interpretation of Section 17.022 of the Civil Practice &
Remedies Code was important in determining whether a new, separate suit
against the individual partner was required. The court held that when
Fincher received actual service as general partner for Yellow Ribbon, even
in his capacity as trustee, Fincher was also before the trial court as a general
partner. Therefore, a judgment establishing partnership liability was also a
judgment against the partner individually. 1 2
Justice Maribel argued in his dissenting opinion that a reasonable person
A would not be put on notice that he is being sued individually when he is
served with a citation addressed to ABC Partnership and a petition naming
ABC Partnership, B, individually, and C, individually (but without naming
A, individually, as a defendant).1 13
111. Fincher, 816 S.W.2d at 512-13.
112. Id. at 513. In this case, Yellow Ribbon and Fincher never denied their partner status,
Id. at 512, which the court used to support its ruling that partner status could not be contro-
verted at trial. The appellate court also held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
allowing the pleadings to be amended, after the trial, to add Fincher as a party defendant in his
individual capacity because it was not necessary to name Fincher individually. Id. at 514.
113. Id. Justice Maribel also argued that the post-trial amendment that added Fincher,
individually, as a party defendant, when he did not participate in the trial or file any pleadings
in the case, individually, was insufficient to authorize a judgment against Fincher, individually.
Id.
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